What CodeParty protects,
and what it explicitly does not.
Plain answers about what runs where, what stays on your Mac, and what CodeParty will refuse to do.
The renderer is sandboxed by construction
The Electron shell uses contextIsolation, sandbox mode, and no Node access in the renderer. The preload script exposes a narrow, typed IPC surface — the editor cannot reach out to your filesystem or shell directly.
Provider sign-in stays with each participant's CLI
Each participant signs in through their own installed Codex, Claude, Gemini, or GitHub Copilot CLI. CodeParty does not ask for provider keys as party settings or intentionally store or broadcast them. Prompts and CLI output can enter party traffic, so avoid putting secrets in either. An expired CLI session must be refreshed through that provider's CLI.
File paths and processes are constrained
All file paths are normalized and constrained to the selected member worktree. Child processes are launched via argument arrays with shell:false, a working-directory check, and timeouts. .env, provider credentials, home directories, and arbitrary client paths are never broadcast.
LAN and internet parties have different boundaries
The packaged host listens on port 4242 for trusted LAN parties. LAN party sessions use tokens and rate-limited joins, but account sign-in does not make that port safe to expose directly to the public internet. Internet sharing instead makes an outbound HTTPS/WSS connection to the deployed relay and requires a verified account, host approval, and party-scoped credentials. The relay terminates TLS, so transport is not end-to-end encrypted against its operator. Each participant's CLI and worktree stay on that participant's machine.
Merge Party is refused by default
A Merge Party requires a passing virtual merge, zero known conflicts, an explicit confirmation, and a clean root worktree. Any failure refuses the merge. Uncommitted agent edits are visible in the party but do not count until they are committed to the seat branch.